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1. Introduction 
In the Kokkinakis decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) accepted 
that under Article 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),1 ‘a certain 
margin of appreciation is to be left to the Contracting States in assessing the existence 
and extent of the necessity of an interference’.2 The margin of appreciation (MoA) is 
designed to legitimize the ECtHR’s judgments by giving effect to the principle of 
subsidiary.3 However, the ECtHR’s use of the MoA in its freedom of religion or 
belief jurisprudence has been subject to significant criticism.4  
  This chapter starts from the position that the MoA is a permanent fixture in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence and also serves a legitimate purpose. However, a full review 
of the ECtHR’s freedom of religion or belief jurisprudence reveals that the manner in 
which it is employed is often problematic. It is argued that the justifications proffered 
by the ECtHR to legitimize the award of the MoA are frequently flawed insofar as 
they are either applied inconsistently or are an inappropriate basis for deference. 
Furthermore, contrary to the ECtHR’s established position that the ‘margin of 
                                                
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, C.E.T.S. 005, entered 
into force 3 September 1953. 
2 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, European Court of Human Rights, No. 14307/88, para 47. 
3 Article 1 of Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms CETS No. 213 opened for signature, 24 June 2013, not yet in force. 
4 See, for example, Carolyn Evans, ‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’, 7 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, (2006), p. 52; Malcolm D. Evans, ‘Freedom of Religion and 
the European Convention on Human Rights; Approaches, Trends and Tensions’ in Peter Cane, Carolyn 
Evans and Zoë Robinson (eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, ‘“Taking Religion Seriously”? 
Human Rights and Hijab in Europe – Some Problems of Adjudication’, 24 Journal of Law and 
Religion, (2008–2009), p. 599; Stephanie E. Berry, ‘A Tale of Two Instruments: Religious Minorities 
and the Council of Europe’s Rights Regime’, 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2012); 
Kristin Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights’ Concern Regarding European Consensus 
Tempers the Effective Protection of Freedom of Religion’ 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 
(2015). 
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appreciation goes hand in hand with a European supervision’,5 in practice, the award 
of the MoA frequently results in a lack of scrutiny of the necessity of limitations on 
religious freedom. Thus, although the award of the MoA can be legitimate, its use is 
often too expansive and damages the protected content of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief.    
 This chapter, first, introduces the ECtHR’s MoA by elaborating its purpose 
alongside the key justifications and criticisms of its use. Second, the use of the MoA 
by the ECtHR in its Article 9 ECHR and Article 2 Protocol 1 jurisprudence is 
analyzed. The instances where the ECtHR employs the MoA are broadly divided into 
three categories: deference justified by a lack of consensus; deference in the case of a 
clash of rights; and deference on the basis that the national authorities are better-
placed. While, for the most part, deference on these grounds can be rationalized, in 
practice the award of the MoA remains problematic.  
 
2. The Margin of Appreciation 
 
The MoA is a judicial construct6 and despite not finding a basis in the text of the 
Convention has become well-entrenched in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Originally 
adopted in the context of the derogations clause, contained in Article 15 ECHR,7 the 
MoA has subsequently been applied in relation to the qualified rights8 and, more 
                                                
5 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 13 December 2001, European Court of 
Human Rights, No. 45701/99, para 119; İzzettin Doğan and others v. Turkey, 26 April 2016, European 
Court of Human Rights, No. 62649/10, para 113; Leyla Șahın v. Turkey, 10 November 2005, European 
Court of Human Rights, No. 44774/98,  para 110.  
6 Dean Spielmann, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation’ UCL - Current Legal Problems Lecture 20 
March 2014, p. 6. 
7 Greece v United Kingdom, 2 June 1956, European Commission on Human Rights, No 176/56, para 
136; Lawless v Ireland, 30 August 1958, European Commission on Human Rights, No 332/57, para 90;  
Ireland v United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, European Court of Human Rights, No 5310/71, para 207.  
8 The Vagrancy Case (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium, 18 June 1971, European Court of 
Human Rights, No. 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66, para 93; Engel and Others v the Netherlands, 8 June 
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recently, ‘all of the substantive articles’.9 While the ECtHR’s deference to States 
through the MoA has been subject to consistent criticism, this chapter starts from the 
position that the MoA is a permanent and irreversible fixture in the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. This view is bolstered by the reference to the MoA in Protocol 15 (not 
yet in force), which will formalize its existence. 10   
 The MoA has been described as the ‘room for manoeuvre’ or discretion 
afforded to States parties11  and as a doctrine of underenforcement of convention 
rights,12 ‘judicial deference’13 or ‘self-restraint’.14 By allowing discretion to States in 
complex or controversial matters, its use has been lauded for acknowledging the 
ECtHR’s limitations as an international mechanism of adjudication and, specifically, 
that national authorities may be better placed to determine the appropriate course of 
action in a given set of circumstances.15 The unique position of the ECtHR as an 
international mechanism that oversees domestic decision-making underpins such 
deference. 16   Indeed, Spielmann suggests that ‘the MoA is necessary to make 
interference by an international court with the sovereignty of democratic States 
                                                                                                                                      
1976, European Court of Human Rights, No. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, para 100; 
Handyside v United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, European Court of Human Rights, No. 5493/72, 
paras 48-9; Kokkinakis, supra note 2. 
9 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application 
by the Human Rights Committee’, 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2016), p. 23.  
10 Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms CETS 213, Strasbourg 24 June 2013. 
11  Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006), pp. 203–13; Howard C. Yourow, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 
(London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) p. 192; Jan Kratochivíl, ‘The Inflation of the Margin 
of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’, 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights (2011), p. 327.   
12 Dimitrios Tsarapatsanis, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Low-Level Institutional View’, 
35 Legal Studies (2015), p. 675.  
13 Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and 
Proportionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) p. 27. 
14 McGoldrick, supra note 9, p. 22.  
15 Robert Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’, 
14 Human Rights Law Review (2014), p. 499; McGoldrick, supra note 9, p. 33.  
16  Andrew Drzemczewski, ‘The Sui Generis Nature of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1980) p. 54. 
 4 
tolerable and politically acceptable’. 17  Thus, the MoA serves to legitimize the 
ECtHR’s decisions. 
 However, despite these justifications, the ECtHR’s use of the MoA has been 
subject to intense criticism from both judges within the Court 18 and academics, on the 
basis that it is applied inconsistently, unevenly and, in some instances, its use is 
simply superfluous.19 The apparently ad hoc manner20 in which the MoA is employed 
has led Brauch to conclude that it is incompatible with the rule of law.21  Furthermore, 
the MoA has also been construed as an abrogation of the ECtHR’s duties,22 on the 
basis that it fails to recognize the deficiencies inherent in democratic processes and 
has the potential to subject minorities to the tyranny of the majority.23   
Under Article 9 ECHR and Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR, States have been 
permitted a MoA in cases concerning the registration of religious communities, 24 
religious clothing, 25  access to religiously compliant food 26  and other materials 
                                                
17 McGoldrick, supra note 9, p. 33.   
18 Z v. Finland, 25 February 1997, European Court of Human Rights, No. 22009/93 partly dissenting 
opinion of Judge De Meyer; Egeland and Hanseid v Norway, 16 April 2009, European Court of 
Human Rights, No. 34438/04 concurring opinion of Judge Rozakis. 
19 See generally, Kratochivíl, supra note 11. See also, George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of 
Appreciation’, 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2006), p. 714.   
20 Kratochivíl, supra note 11, p. 351.   
21 Jeffrey A. Brauch, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ 11 Columbia Journal of European Law (2004-2005) p. 113. 
22 Tsarapatsanis, supra note 12, p. 676. 
23 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’, 31 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Policy (1998-1999), p. 853.  
24 Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and others v. Austria, 31 July 2008, European Court of 
Human Rights, No. 40825/98, para 96; Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and others v. Hungary, 
8 April 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 70945/11; 23611/12; 26998/12; 41150/12; 
41155/12; 41463/12; 41553/12; 54977/12; 56581/12 para 87; Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim Ve Kültür Merkezi 
Vakfi v. Turkey, 2 December 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 32093/11, para 47. 
25 Șahın, supra note 45; Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 February 2001, European Court of Human Rights, 
No. 42393/98; Dogru v. France, 4 December 2008, European Court of Human Rights, No. 27058/05; 
Ebrahimian v. France, 26 November 2015, European Court of Human Rights, No. 64846/11; SAS v. 
France, 1 July 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 43835/11; Eweida and others v. The 
United Kingdom, 15 January 2013, European Court of Human Rights, Nos. 48420/10; 36516/10; 
51671/10; 59842/10; Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey, 23 February 2010, European Court of Human 
Rights, No, 41135/98.  
26 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 27 June 2000, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
27417/95; Jakóbski v. Poland, 7 December 2010, European Court of Human Rights, No. 18429/06, 
para. 47; Vartic v. Romania (no 2), 17 December 2013, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
14150/08. 
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necessary for worship,27 planning permission for places of worship,28 proselytism29 
and religious education.30 While the MoA afforded under Article 9 ECHR originated 
in the Kokkinakis decision31 the precise justification for deference differs from case to 
case. Nevertheless, the award of the MoA in the ECtHR’s freedom of religion or 
belief jurisprudence appears, in many of these cases, to be legitimate. However, it is 
argued here that many of the identified critiques of the MoA are relevant to the 
ECtHR’s religious freedom jurisprudence.  
 
3. Lack of Consensus  
 
The consensus doctrine is adopted by the ECtHR in order to determine the width of 
the MoA left to State parties. The two have an inverse relationship.32 Thus, if little or 
no consensus is identified in a particular area, States are permitted a wide MoA, and 
vice versa.33 Like the MoA, the consensus doctrine is a judicial construct with no 
basis in the text of the ECHR. It also serves to legitimize the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, 
by rooting interpretations of Convention rights in the practice of State parties. This 
function is particularly important when the ECtHR adopts evolutive interpretation to 
expand the scope of Convention rights, by providing ‘an objective, measurable 
interpretive criterion, as opposed to the judge’s individual moral preference’. 34 
However, in instances where no consensus is observed, the doctrine is used to 
                                                
27 Kovaļkovs v Latvia, 31 January 2012, European Court of Human Rights, No. 5021/05. 
28 Johannische Kirche & Peters v. Germany, 10 July 2001, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
41754/98. 
29 Kokkinakis, supra note 2; Dahlab, supra note 25. 
30 Folgerø and others v. Norway, 29 June 2007, European Court of Human Rights, No. 15472/02; 
Hasan and Eylem Zengın v. Turkey, 9 October 2007, European Court of Human Rights, No. 1448/04. 
31 Kokkinakis, supra note 2. 
32 Benvenisti, supra note 23, p. 851. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Carmen Draghici, ‘The Strasbourg Court between European and Local Consensus: Anti-Democratic 
or Guardian of Democratic Process’ Public Law [2017] p. 13.  
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legitimize a policy of non-intervention by the ECtHR through the award of a wide 
MoA. Indeed, McGoldrick argues that ‘[t]he MoA can thus be understood as a device 
which mediates between the idea of universal human rights and leaving space for 
reasonable disagreement, legitimate differences, and national or local cultural 
diversity’.35  
 Nonetheless, deference on the basis of lack of consensus remains problematic. 
By allowing State practice to determine whether limitations on Convention rights are 
acceptable, the ECtHR ‘reverts difficult policy questions back to national institutions, 
in complete disregard of their weaknesses’.36 Specifically, this approach has the 
potential to allow majorities an unchecked power to limit the rights of minorities and 
does not observe whether ‘hostile-external preferences’ are at play.37 As deference on 
the basis of a lack of consensus effectively narrows the protected scope of Convention 
rights, Brauch has criticised the consensus doctrine for undermining both human 
rights and the rule of law.38 Further, the ECtHR has been accused of not adopting a 
consistent methodology when determining the existence of a consensus. 39 
 A particular issue in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is identifying the level at 
which a lack of consensus should be determined: at the abstract level of general 
principle, or at a concrete level, in relation to the specific issue raised by the case 
before it. 40 The appropriate level depends on whether the ECtHR is understood to 
                                                
35 McGoldrick, supra note 9, p. 41.    
36 Benvenisti, supra note 23, p.  853.  
37 Ibid. Letsas, supra note 19, p. p. 729. 
38 Jeffrey A. Brauch, ‘The Dangerous Search for a Elusive Consensus: What the Supreme Court Should 
Learn from the European Court of Human Rights’ 52 Howard Law Journal (2008-09) p. 278. 
39 Henrard, supra note 3, p. 416. 
40 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case 
Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ Public Law  [2011] p. 542; Henrard, supra note 3, p. 
417. 
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perform a constitutional function or serve the ends of individual justice. 41 This 
section considers the award of a MoA on the basis of a lack of abstract and concrete 
consensus, exploring both the legitimacy of the ECtHR's lack of consensus 
determination and the impact of the MoA in practice.  
 
3.1. Abstract Consensus and the Legitimacy of Deference  
In its freedom of religion or belief jurisprudence, the ECtHR has consistently justified 
the award of a wide MoA on the basis of a lack of European consensus regarding two 
abstract concepts: ‘the significance of religion in society’ 42  and Church-State 
relations.43 Rather than being directly relevant to the specific interference with 
individual religious freedom raised by the case, these abstract concepts relate to the 
relationship between the State and religion. This section argued that both of these 
concepts are an inappropriate basis from which to determine the width of a State’s 
MoA. 
 Despite recognizing in Kokkinakis that ‘[t]he pluralism indissociable from a 
democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it 
[freedom of religion or belief]’,44 the ECtHR has subsequently questioned ‘the 
significance of religion in society’.45 By awarding States a wide MoA on this basis, 
the ECtHR calls into question the foundations of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief. Namely, that regardless of the State religion or beliefs of the majority 
                                                
41 For further discussion of the role of the ECtHR see: Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Alan Greene 
‘Restructuring the European Court of Human Rights: preserving the right of individual petition and 
promoting constitutionalism’ Public Law [2013] p. 710. 
42Șahın, supra note 5, para.109. 
43 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek, supra note 26, para. 84; Șahın, ibid, para. 109; Sindicatul "Păstorul Cel 
Bun" v. Romania, 9 July 2013, European Court of Human Rights, No. 2330/09, para. 138.  
44 Kokkinakis, supra note 2, para 31.  
45 Șahın, supra note 5, para 109 
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population, individual religious freedom is deserving of protection.46  Indeed, ‘the 
significance of religion in society’ does not diminish the importance of the right for 
religious individuals. If human rights seek to protect vulnerable minorities from the 
tyranny of the majority,47 then societal priorities must not be used to restrict or narrow 
individual rights. Any reduction of ‘the significance of religion in society’ increases 
the importance of article 9 ECHR, rather than providing a basis for narrowing its 
protected scope. Furthermore, the award of a wide MoA on this basis suggests that 
Article 9 ECHR is only of concern to those holding religious beliefs. Yet, this 
overlooks the value of this right to ‘atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned’.48 The award of a MoA on this basis, thus, undermines a good faith 
interpretation of Article 9 ECHR.   
 In Sindicatul “Păstorul Cel Bun” the ECtHR also noted ‘the wide variety of 
constitutional models governing relations between States and religious denominations 
in Europe’.49 The lack of consensus in relation to Church-State relations has resulted 
in State being permitted a wide MoA to limit religious freedom. The former President 
of the ECtHR, Nicholas Bratza has defended this approach on the basis that it allows 
the ECtHR to ‘strike a balance between, on the one hand, the effective protection of 
individual rights and, on the other, the need to respect very different constitutional 
traditions among the Contracting States’.50 From a pragmatic perspective, the award 
of a MoA on this basis allows the ECtHR to avoid making unpopular decisions that 
criticize national traditions.51 However, a consensus did not exist in relation to 
                                                
46 Stephanie E. Berry, ‘A “Good Faith” Interpretation of the Right to Manifest Religion? The 
Diverging Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and UN Human Rights Committee’, 
Legal Studies (2017) [accessed via Early View] p. 22.  
47 Benvenisti, supra note 23, p. 853.  
48 Kokkinakis, supra note 2, para 31.  
49 Sindicatul "Păstorul Cel Bun", supra note 43. 
50  Nicolas Bratza, ‘The “Precious Asset”: Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2012) 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 256, 257-258. 
51 Henrard, supra note 3, p. 420. 
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Church-State relations at the time Article 9 ECHR was adopted. Constitutional 
traditions and national identity have been used throughout history to justify 
interference with religious freedom. 52  It is significant that this type of State 
interference motivated the adoption of the right to religious freedom.53 Consequently, 
the award of a wide MoA on this basis is incompatible with a good faith interpretation 
of Article 9 ECHR.  
 The two areas in which the ECtHR has identified a lack of abstract consensus 
are an inappropriate basis for deference, as they are both incompatible with a good 
faith interpretation of religious freedom. Yet, the use of an abstract consensus in order 
to determine the width of a State’s MoA is not inherently flawed. The identified 
consensus, or lack thereof, must be compatible with a good faith interpretation of the 
right. Significantly, the framing of the question will impact whether it is possible to 
identify a consensus.  Thus, while it is not possible to identify a consensus in relation 
to ‘Church-State relations’ or ‘the significance of religion in society’, taken to a 
further level of abstraction, it is possible to identify an consensus amongst Council of 
Europe member States in relation to the basic principles upon which constitutional 
arrangements are required rest. As established in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the State 
must act as the ‘neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, 
faiths and beliefs’.54  
 The requirements of neutrality and impartiality have underpinned the ECtHR’s 
Article 9 ECHR jurisprudence55 and have not been questioned by member States, 
regardless of their constitutional traditions. While the concept of neutrality is not 
unproblematic—not least because the ECtHR has used it inconsistently in its 
                                                
52 Statement of Mr Van der Mandele (The Netherlands) at ECOSOC, Record of 215th Meeting held on 
25 August 1958 UN doc E/SR.215, p 644. 
53 Berry, supra note 46, p. 8  
54 Șahın, supra note 5, para.107. 
55 Ibid; Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, supra note 5, para 116; Dogru supra note 25, para. 106. 
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jurisprudence—56 it is a far more satisfactory basis for the determination of whether a 
consensus exists. In principle, it is compatible with a good faith interpretation of the 
right to manifest religion, in particular the requirements of State non-interference in 
matters of conscience and the equal treatment of different beliefs.57 However, this 
would result in the adoption of an entirely new approach under Article 9(2) ECHR. 
Specifically, as a consensus arguably does exist in this respect, it would result in the 
corresponding narrowing of the MoA. 
 
1.3.2 Concrete Consensus and the Legitimacy of Deference 
The ECtHR has sought to identify a concrete consensus in a number of Article 9 
ECHR cases, primarily concerning religious symbols. However, it has also examined 
whether a concrete consensus exists in cases concerning conscientious objection,58  
and the acceptance of Scientology as a religion.59 As noted by Henrard, that ‘[t]he 
appropriate level of concreteness is the one that connects most directly to the central 
matter of the case’.60 However, the process used by the ECtHR to determine whether  
a concrete consensus exists, gives rise to two specific issues, first, what is meant by a 
consensus, and second, the impact of the framing of the issue on the ECtHR’s 
determination of whether a consensus exists.  
                                                
56 See further, Peter Petkoff and Malcolm Evans, Chapter in this collection; Malcolm Evans and Peter 
Petkoff, ‘A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ 36 Religion, State and Society (2008) p. 205; Julie Ringelheim, 
‘State Religious Neutrality as a Common European Standard? Reappraising the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Approach’ 6 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2017), p. 24. 
57 Berry, supra note 46, p.10. 
58Bayatyan v. Armenia, 7 July 201, European Court of Human Rights, No. 23459/03, paras 103, 124.  
59 Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, 5 April 2007, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
18147/02, para. 64; Kimlya and Others v. Russia, 1 October 2009, European Court of Human Rights, 
Nos. 76836/01 and 32782/03, para 79. 
60 Henrard, supra note 3, p. 417.  
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 The ECtHR has been accused of not adopting a consistent methodology when 
determining the existence of a consensus under Article 9 ECHR.61 As a result, 
consensus in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can refer to unanimity; a percentage or the 
majority (of States); or a trend in a particular direction. 62 This inconsistency is 
apparent in the ECtHR’s religious symbols jurisprudence, where the level of 
unanimity required to determine the existence of a consensus varies from case to case.  
In Lautsi, the ECtHR determined that no consensus existed amongst Council 
of Europe member States in relation to the compulsory presence of a crucifix in 
classrooms in Italy. Specifically, the ECtHR identified a wide range of practices with 
some States prohibiting the presence of such symbols, some requiring the presence of 
such symbols and many States simply not having legislated on the matter.63  In 
contrast, in Șahın the ECtHR carried out a detailed examination of the restriction of 
the hijab in educational institutions in Europe.64 The comparative analysis revealed 
that only France, in addition to Turkey, had legislated to impose a blanket ban on 
religious clothing in State-funded educational institutions. However, as other States 
allowed schools discretion to decide whether religious clothing was permitted, the 
ECtHR determined that no consensus existed.65 In SAS, concerning the ban on the 
covering of the face in public, the consensus was even more overwhelming, with only 
Belgium having adopted an analogous law.66 Yet, the ECtHR determined that no 
consensus existed,67 suggesting that complete unanimity is required for a concrete 
consensus to be identified by the ECtHR.  
                                                
61 Ibid, p. 416. 
62 Dzehtsiarou, supra note 40, pp. 541-42.  
63 Lautsi and others v. Italy, 18 March 2011, European Court of Human Rights, No. 30814/06, paras 
26-28, 70. 
64 Șahın, supra note 5, paras 55-65. 
65 Ibid., para 109. 
66 SAS v. France, supra note 25, para 40.  
67 Ibid., para 156.  
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However, a less onerous consensus test was imposed in Eweida, where the 
ECtHR found that ‘in the majority of States the wearing of religious clothing and/or 
religious symbols in the workplace is unregulated’, despite finding evidence of the 
practice being regulated in ten States.68  Despite affirming the presence of a consensus 
regarding the regulation of religious symbols in the workplace, in Ebrahimian, the 
ECtHR went on to justify the award of a wide MoA on the basis of the lack of 
abstract consensus regarding Church-State relations.69  
The apparently inconsistent manner in which the ECtHR has identified the 
existence of a concrete consensus is problematic from the perspective of legal 
certainty and the rule of law.70  Nonetheless, there have been some attempts to explain 
this discrepancy, most notably in relation to SAS.71 McGoldrick has, for example, 
suggested that the consensus doctrine allows ‘States to impose new restrictions on 
rights and these may fall within the MoA even if other States have not imposed them’. 
72 Draghici has, furthermore, argued that the identification of consensus amongst all 
Council of member States in this scenario is inappropriate, as ‘unresponsiveness to 
non-existent problems has no evidentiary value. In fact, the consensus doctrine 
measures attitudes and legal solutions adopted in respect of similar socio-political 
dilemmas’. 73 Yet, these justifications are insufficient to justify the inconsistencies in 
the ECtHR’s Article 9 ECHR jurisprudence. In SAS, even if only similar States were 
surveyed by the ECtHR, then an overwhelming consensus was still apparent. 74 This 
would also have excluded States such as Latvia, which have subsequently gone on to 
                                                
68 Eweida, supra note 25, para 47. 
69 Ebrahimian, supra note 25, para. 65. 
70 Brauch, supra note 38, p. 278, 290. 
71 McGoldrick, supra note 9, p. 29; Draghici, supra note 34, p. 18.  
72 McGoldrick, ibid, p 29.  
73 Draghici, supra note 34, p. 18.  
74 SAS, supra note 25, partially dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, para 19.  
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adopt a so-called ‘burqa ban’.75 Further, the award of a wide MoA on the basis of an 
emerging trend or societal development, has the potential to legitimize growing 
intolerance and fails to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Indeed, the 
ECtHR noted the Islamophobic tone of the debate that preceded the adoption of the 
French‘burqa ban’.76 The ECtHR cannot simply defer to States if it is to act as a 
check on State power. 
 The framing of the issue is also central to whether the ECtHR is able to 
identify whether a concrete consensus exists. In Șahın, the ECtHR, in part, based the 
award of a wide MoA on the lack of consensus amongst Council of Europe member 
States in relation ‘to regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational 
institutions’.77 However, this conclusion was reached by comparing State practice in 
relation to educational institutions, in general, rather than universities, in particular. 
As noted by Judge Tulkens ‘in none of the member States has the ban on wearing 
religious symbols extended to university education, which is intended for young 
adults, who are less amenable to pressure’.78 Notably, in Dahlab, the age and 
vulnerability of the pupils had been central to the ECtHR’s acceptance that 
Switzerland had a MoA to restrict the religious freedom of teachers.79 Thus, while the 
ECtHR in Șahın considered whether a concrete consensus existed in relation to the 
issue raised by the case, the framing of the issue influenced the outcome of its 
comparative analysis.  
                                                
75 For example, Rachael Pells, Islamic face veil to be banned in Latvia despite being worn by just three 
women, 21 April 2016 , The Independent, <www.independent.co.uk/news/islamic-muslim-face-veil-
niqab-burqa-banned-latvia-despite-being-worn-by-just-three-women-entire-a6993991.html>, 29 
September 2017. 
76 SAS, supra note 25, para 149. 
77 Șahın, supra note 5, para 109.  
78 Ibid.,Judge Tulkens dissenting opinion para 3.  
79 Dahlab, supra note 25. 
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 The inconsistent approach adopted by the ECtHR when determining if a 
concrete consensus exists has the potential to delegitimize its jurisprudence. Indeed, 
the approach adopted leads to the conclusion that rather than seeking to protect the 
rights of vulnerable minorities, ‘the Court’s use of the European consensus factor 
enables it to avoid taking a stance on (often controversial) matters that are closely 
intertwined with deeply held national constitutional values and the related national 
constitutional identity’. 80 
 
3.2. The Impact of Deference on the Basis of a Lack of Consensus  
 
A lack of abstract consensus is often used to award States a wide MoA to restrict 
individual religious freedom in cases where the interference with individual religious 
freedom seeks to uphold or protect constitutional traditions or concerns the 
relationship between the State and religious communities. Thus, the impact of the 
MoA in these instances warrants further exploration. In contrast, a lack of concrete 
consensus is primarily used to bolster another justification for the award of a MoA 
and, thus, is not discussed in detail here.81  
 
3.2.1. Constitutional Traditions  
Constitutional traditions have successfully been invoked in order to justify the 
limitation of individual rights under Article 9 ECHR and Article 2 Protocol 1. 
Specifically, under the MoA, the ECtHR has deferred to States on the basis of both 
secular82 and Christian traditions.83 Deference on this basis is not absolute. Although 
                                                
80 Henrard, supra note 3, p. 414. 
81Șahın, supra note 5; SAS, supra note 25. 
82 Șahın, ibid; Dahlab, supra note 25; Dogru supra note 25; Ebrahimian, supra note 25. 
83 Folgerø, supra note 30; Lautsi, supra note 63. 
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States have a wide MoA, the ECtHR has emphasised that this must be consistent with 
the role of the State as the ‘neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various 
religions, faiths and beliefs’.84 Notably, the width of the MoA available to States 
appears to differ according to which tradition is invoked.  
 In the context of cases concerning religious clothing, the ECtHR has accepted 
that restrictions on religious clothing in State institutions, underpinned by the pursuit 
of the constitutional tradition of secularism, fall within the State’s MoA.85 The width 
of the MoA in these cases is bolstered by the purported lack of concrete consensus in 
relation to religious clothing in State institutions.86 Despite consistently reiterating 
that ‘[t]his margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with a European supervision 
embracing both the law and the decisions applying it’,87 the ECtHR often avoids 
scrutinizing whether the interference with Article 9 ECHR was necessary in a 
democratic society, as required by Article 9(2) ECHR.88  Specifically, Carolyn Evans 
has noted that ‘[i]n the headscarf cases, the Court ... does not question the elevated 
position of secularism’.89 Indeed, in Dogru, the ECtHR indicated that secularism is to 
be prioritized above individual religious freedom.90  This approach is underpinned by 
the ECtHR’s acceptance that secularism is ‘consistent with the values underpinning 
the Convention’.91   
 The lack of scrutiny of the necessity of restrictions on individual religious 
freedom in cases concerning secularism can be attributed to two presumptions made 
                                                
84 Șahın, supra note 5, para.107. 
85 Berry, supra note 46. See further, Jeremy Gunn, Chapter 6.  
86 Șahın, supra note 5, para. 40. 
87 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others, supra note 5, para 119; Doğan supra note 5, para 
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88 See for example, Jasvir Singh v France, 30 June 2009, European Court of Human Rights, No.  
25463/08; Ranjit Singh v France, 30 June 2009, European Court of Human Rights, No. 27561/08.  
89 Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: 
Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture’ 26 Journal of Law and Religion (2010-2011), p. 336. 
90 Dogru supra note 25, para. 72.  
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by the ECtHR. First, the ECtHR has predetermined that secular constitutional 
traditions are compatible with the role of the State as the ‘neutral and impartial 
organiser’. 92 Second, the ECtHR presumes that secularism seeks to uphold the 
religious freedom of all members of society and, therefore, any limitation on this basis 
falls within the ground of ‘the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.93 
However, both of these presumptions are flawed. Secularism is not a monolith, and in 
some interpretations is actively hostile to religion.94 Hostile secularism is primarily 
concerned with eliminating religion from the public sphere, rather than the protection 
of individual freedoms.95 Consequently, secularism cannot be presumed to be neutral 
and impartial nor is it necessarily concerned with upholding individual religious 
freedom.96 Thus, the ECtHR should exercise a higher level of scrutiny of the necessity 
of limitations underpinned by secularism. 
 In direct contrast, the MoA afforded to States on the basis of Christian 
traditions appears to be narrower, as the ECtHR has explicitly scrutinized whether the 
interference with the applicant’s rights complies with the requirements of neutrality 
and impartiality. In Folgerø, the ECtHR was willing to accept that the prioritization of 
Christianity within the religious education syllabus fell within the State’s MoA ‘[i]n 
view of the place occupied by Christianity in the national history and tradition of the 
respondent State’.97 Similarly, in Lautsi, the Grand Chamber held that ‘the decision 
whether or not to perpetuate a tradition falls in principle within the margin of 
appreciation of the respondent State’.98 However, in Lautsi, the Grand Chamber also 
                                                
92 Ibid.  
93 McGoldrick, supra note 9, p. 52. 
94 Rex Adhar, ‘Is Secularism Neutral?’ 25 Ratio Juris (2013) p. 411.  
95 Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe, ‘Church-state relations in Europe’ 1 Religion Compass (2007) p. 
565. 
96 Berry, supra note 46, pp. 16-7. 
97 Folgerø, supra note 30, para. 89.  
98 Lautsi supra note 63, para. 68. 
 17 
observed that ‘that the reference to a tradition cannot relieve a Contracting State of its 
obligation to respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention and its 
Protocols.’99 Rather than accepting that restrictions are prima facie legitimate, as it 
did in the secularism cases, the ECtHR considered whether the State had struck an 
appropriate balance. In Folgerø, despite the State’s MoA, the ECtHR carried out a 
detailed analysis of the religious education syllabus and concluded that it was 
incompatible with the State’s role as a ‘neutral and impartial organiser’.100 Thus, 
while a wide MoA is permitted on the basis of the Christian traditions of the State, 
underpinned by the lack of consensus in this area, the ECtHR does not take for 
granted that limitations are neutral and impartial.  
 Notably, in Zengın, which is analogous to Folgerø, the ECtHR did not 
recognize that the State had a MoA concerning Islamic traditions.101 As the ECtHR 
carried out a similar level of analysis in Zengın as in Følgero, this suggests that the 
reference to the MoA in Følgero was unnecessary.102 The ECtHR could simply 
consider whether the interference with religious freedom was justifiable under the 
limitations clause.103 Moreover, it also suggests that the scope of the MoA permitted 
on the basis of national traditions is contingent upon the extent to which those 
traditions are perceived by the ECtHR to be consistent with the role of the State as 
‘the neutral and impartial organiser’ and the values underpinning the Convention. The 
ECtHR has found Islam to be incompatible with both.104 Thus, while the ECtHR is 
                                                
99 Ibid. 
100 Folgerø, supra note 30, paras. 95-100.  
101 Zengın, supra note 30. 
102 Henrard, supra note 3, p. 409. 
103 See further, T. Jeremy Gunn, ‘Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis’ 19 Emory 
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willing to afford a MoA on the basis of secular and Christian traditions, it seems 
unlikely that this will be extended to Islamic traditions.  
In practice, the ECtHR uses the lack of consensus in relation to Church-State 
relations to avoid scrutinizing the necessity of limitations on the right to manifest 
religion in cases where the constitutional tradition of secularism is invoked. In 
contrast, it does scrutinize the necessity of limitations in cases involving Christian 
traditions. The apparent discrepancy between the treatment of different traditions can 
be rationalized on the basis that secular tradition are presumed by the ECtHR to be 
consistent with the requirements of neutrality and impartiality. Given that this is based 
on a mistaken presumption, the ECtHR should exert a higher level of scrutiny in these 
cases.  
 
3.2.2. The Relationship between the State and Religious Communities 
On the basis of the ‘wide variety of constitutional models governing relations between 
the State and religious groups’, the ECtHR has accepted that States have a MoA 
‘where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at 
stake’.105 States are also permitted a MoA to determine the appropriate constitutional 
model ‘to reconcile the interests of the various religions and religious groups that 
coexist in a democratic society’.106  As with the cases concerning constitutional 
traditions, the MoA is subject to the requirement that the State act in a neutral and 
impartial manner. However, in practice, the limits of this MoA are more clearly 
defined, as the ECtHR frequently scrutinizes whether the interference with Article 9 
ECHR is underpinned by arbitrary or discriminatory justifications under Article 14 
                                                
105 Doğan, supra note 5, para 113.  
106 Kokkinakis, supra note 2, para. 33; Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan 
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ECHR. For example, while the ECtHR has recognized that States are permitted to 
require the registration of religious communities and organisations,107 it has also 
recognized that denial or removal of official status may render the right to freedom of 
religion or belief illusory.108 Consequently, ‘in the absence of relevant and sufficient 
reasons’ to justify the denial, the ECtHR has determined that the State has 
overstepped its MoA.109 Specifically, States have overstepped their MoA if they deny 
official status on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds.110  
 While religious communities can be required to register, the failure to obtain 
an official status does not permit the State to interfere with the individual exercise of 
the right to manifest religion. Consequently, in both Manoussakis and Masaev, the 
State had overstepped its MoA by prosecuting individuals for practicing an 
unregistered religion.111 The denial of the right to conscientious objection from 
civilian service in Lang and Löffelmann, also fell outside the State’s MoA, as the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses had been discriminatorily denied a status that would allowed 
their members to exercise this right.112 
 In addition to the formal regulation of religions by the State, the lack of 
consensus ‘with regard to establishment of the delicate relations between the 
Churches and the State’,113 was used in Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek to justify the 
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award of a MoA  to regulate kosher slaughter. State regulation in this respect is not 
directly analogous to the registration of religion and, in fact, the award of a MoA here 
suggests that States can use the lack of consensus in relation to Church-State relations 
to justify almost any interference with religious freedom. Nonetheless, the award of 
the MoA appears to be superfluous as the ECtHR scrutinized whether the interference 
with the applicant’s right pursued a legitimate ground of limitation and whether 
alternative kosher meat was available under article 9(2) ECHR. 
 Moreover, despite accepting that States have a MoA ‘to reconcile the interests 
of the various religions and religious groups that coexist in a democratic society’,114 
this has not stopped the ECtHR from scrutinizing the legitimacy of State interference 
in order to resolve internal religious disputes. In Supreme Holy Council of Muslim 
Community and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the State had sought 
to resolve intra-religious leadership disputes. The ECtHR found that Bulgaria had 
overstepped its MoA on the basis that ‘[t]he role of the authorities in a situation of 
conflict between or within religious groups is not to remove the cause of tension by 
eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other’.115 
The requirements of impartiality and neutrality appear to underpin the ECtHR’s 
decision. However, reference to the State’s MoA in this case is unnecessary as the 
ECtHR reached a similar decision in the analogous case of Hasan and Chaush by 
scrutinizing the necessity of the interference under Article 9(2) ECHR without 
reference to the MoA.116 
 Although the ECtHR has recognized that States have a wide MoA to 
determine their relationship with religious communities, this MoA is not unlimited. 
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The ECtHR has consistently examined whether restrictions on religious freedom 
comply with the requirements of impartiality and neutrality under both Articles 9 and 
14 ECHR. Furthermore, the ECtHR has scrutinized whether restrictions are necessary 
in a democratic society or justifiable by reference to grounds set out in the limitations 
clause. Consequently, it appears that the deference afforded to the State in these cases 
does not extend significantly past Article 9(2) ECHR.   
 
4. Reconciling a Clash between Individual Religious Freedom and ‘the Rights 
and Freedoms of Others’ or Other Societal Goals 
 
The ECtHR has accepted that States have a MoA to strike a fair balance ‘between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole’.117 Thus, 
‘various concessions on the part of individuals or groups’ may be necessary ‘to 
maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.118 The MoA in 
this context permits States to determine the appropriate weight to be afforded to 
competing interests.  As Article 9(2) ECHR already allows States to interfere with the 
right to manifest religion in order to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of others’, 
alongside ‘community interests’ such as ‘public safety’, ‘public order’ and ‘health and 
morals’ it is not clear what the MoA adds in this respect. Nonetheless, a degree of 
discretion appears to be appropriate as there will rarely be a right answer, in instances 
that disclose a clash of rights. Yet, there have been two main criticisms of the 
ECtHR’s use of the MoA in these cases: first, the wide interpretation of the 
permissible grounds of limitation, in particular, ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ 
and, second, the failure of the ECtHR to consider whether the case discloses a 
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genuine clash of rights.119 Both of these criticisms are underpinned by a lack of 
scrutiny of the State’s position. 
 The text of Article 9(2) ECHR clearly establishes that restrictions on the right 
to manifest religion in order to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ are 
legitimate, provided such limitations are evidenced to be necessary in a democratic 
society. As noted by this author elsewhere, ‘the ground of “the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others” was ... intended to prevent religious manifestation from 
infringing the concrete rights of individuals, elaborated in human rights 
instruments’.120 However, in practice, the ECtHR has interpreted this ground widely, 
under Articles 8-11 ECHR, to include contractual rights, commercial interests, socio-
economic interests and social policy in addition to ‘the rights and freedoms’ contained 
in the ECHR.121 Thus, in SAS, the ECtHR allowed France a wide MoA to pursue the 
aim of ‘living together’ under ‘the rights and freedom of others’.122 It is clear that this 
expands the scope of this ground beyond its original meaning, as the judges had to 
clarify this point during the oral hearing.123 Despite recognizing that ‘the flexibility of 
the notion of “living together” and the resulting risk of abuse’,124 the ECtHR still 
allowed France discretion to interpret the grounds of limitation broadly. If the ECtHR 
permits the States a MoA to interpret  the scope of permissible grounds of limitation 
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and a MoA to determine the appropriate balance to be struck between competing 
interests, as it did in SAS, this has the potential to results in a complete lack of 
scrutiny of the interference with religious freedom.   
 The wide interpretation of grounds of limitation does not necessarily result in 
a lack of scrutiny. Notably, in Eweida, the ECtHR considered whether the State had 
struck the correct balance by prioritizing ‘the employer’s wish to project a certain 
corporate image’ above the applicant’s right to manifest religion by wearing a 
crucifix.125 The ECtHR interpreted the grounds of limitation broadly and accepted 
that the ‘wish to project a certain corporate image’ fell within ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’. Yet, despite the recognized MoA afforded to national courts to 
determine the proportionality of restrictions in the case of clashing rights,126 the 
ECtHR still concluded that ‘the domestic courts accorded it [the employer’s corporate 
image] too much weight’.127 Thus, the ECtHR scrutinized the necessity of the 
limitation and prioritized Convention rights above other interests when considering 
the proportionality of interferences with Article 9 ECHR. This suggests that the level 
of scrutiny depends on the nature of ‘the rights and freedom of others’ being used to 
justify an interference with a Convention right. Commercial interests may be afforded 
less priority than societal interests, such as integration policies, where the State is 
considered to be better-placed to make a decision.128 
A wide MoA has been awarded to States to reconcile a clash between 
Convention rights, in cases concerning freedom of religion or belief on the one hand, 
and LGBT rights,129 gender equality,130  or the religious freedom of others131 on the 
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other. The limitation of Article 9 ECHR on this basis aligns with a good faith 
interpretation of the ground of ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ and the award of a 
MoA to the State in such difficult cases does not appear to be inappropriate. However, 
as the MoA often leads the ECtHR to accept the position of the State without scrutiny, 
it often fails to consider if the alleged clash actually exists.132  In order to ascertain 
whether a genuine clash of rights exists, Leigh advocates for the application of the 
‘reversibility test’: ‘the reversibility test requires the Court to ask whether another 
identifiable victim would have an admissible Convention claim if the state were to 
“reverse” the outcome by giving priority to the less favoured right’.133 This provides a 
useful basis from which to analyze the impact of the MoA in cases concerning an 
alleged clash of rights. 
 In the Ladele case, the ECtHR accepted that the religious freedom of a 
registrar who refused to officiate civil partnerships on religious grounds, should give 
way to the rights of the LGBT community not to be discriminated again.134 Leigh and 
Hambler argue that although the interference with Ladele’s rights pursued equality for 
the LGBT community, at this time the provision of same-sex civil partnerships was 
not recognized to be a right under the ECHR.135 Thus, if the ‘reversibility test’ were 
applied, there would be no identifiable victim of a rights violation.136 In practice, once 
a State has identified a clashing Convention right, the ECtHR does not appear to 
analyze whether a genuine clash exists. This approach has the potential to permit 
States unchecked discretion to restrict Article 9(1) ECHR. The MoA should not result 
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in blind deference, specifically, where rights or interests are not of equivalent 
standing the principle of ‘priority of rights’137 should prevail.  
 The ECtHR has also recognized that States have a particularly wide MoA to 
pursue gender equality under Article 9(2) ECHR on the basis that it is ‘one of the key 
principles underlying the Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States of 
the Council of Europe’.138 Whilst this appears to be a legitimate justification for the 
restriction of Article 9 ECHR, the uncritical approach of the ECtHR is problematic. In 
the Islamic headscarf cases, the ECtHR has taken at face value the States’ assertion 
that restrictions on the headscarf are necessary to protect gender equality.139 By 
accepting this aim as legitimate, without scrutinizing the necessity of the interference, 
the ECtHR reverses the burden of proof and places the onus on the applicant to 
evidence that the hijab is compatible with gender equality. In practice, only when 
third party interveners provided evidence that contradicted this position in SAS,140 did 
the ECtHR question the ‘gender equality’ argument.141 The ECtHR’s automatic 
acceptance of the State’s position places the applicant at a disadvantage and means 
that the ECtHR does not consider if a genuine clash of rights exists.  
 The ECtHR has also accepted that it is necessary to restrict the manifestation 
of religion in to protect the religious freedom of others in cases of ‘improper pressure’ 
through proselytism. Although States have a MoA to strike the appropriate balance in 
this respect, in the Kokkinakis case, the ECtHR established that the State’s MoA in 
cases concerning Christian witness as opposed to ‘improper evangelism’ is not 
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unlimited and is subject to scrutiny.142 The ECtHR’s reasoning in the Larissis case 
suggests that while proselytism in a personal capacity does not violate the religious 
freedom of others, the right to proselytise can be restricted if there is potential abuse 
of power. 143 Notably, in Larissis, the ECtHR did not make reference to the State’s 
MoA and, rather, analyzed the proportionality of the restriction on individual religious 
freedom. This, yet again, suggests that reference to the MoA in Kokkinakis was 
superfluous as the ECtHR is able to identify whether the correct balance has been 
struck between competing rights by using the limitations clause.  
 However, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in this area is somewhat complicated by 
its acceptance that ‘the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising 
effect’.144 In contrast to the Kokkinakis and Larissis, in these cases the ECtHR does 
not require that the applicant hold a position of power or influence 145 or even have an 
intention to proselytise.146 Notably, in both the Șahın and Dogru cases, the ECtHR did 
not find any evidence that the individual applicants had sought to proselytise147 but 
instead had found that by merely wearing a religious symbol in a State institution, 
they had the potential to exert improper pressure on others.148 This inconsistency with 
the ECtHR’s earlier proselytism jurisprudence can be attributed to the lack of scrutiny 
of the legitimacy of the State’s position. Indeed, were the ‘reversibility test’ applied to 
the headscarf cases, it is clear that there is not a genuine clash of rights. The presence 
of religious symbols in State institutions does not violate the religious freedom of 
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‘others’, as noted by Judge Power in Lautsi, ‘[t]he display of a religious symbol does 
not compel or coerce an individual to do or to refrain from doing anything’.149  
 The ECtHR has permitted States a wide MoA to mediate a clash of rights. It 
would appear to be legitimate to afford States some discretion to decide the 
appropriate course of action in complex cases. However, the award of a MoA to 
States to determine the scope of grounds of limitation in conjunction with a lack of 
scrutiny of whether a genuine clash of rights exists gives States almost carte blanche 
to interfere with the manifestation of religion. In practice, the ECtHR’s position is 
incompatible with a good faith interpretation of Article 9 ECHR and has resulted in 
inconsistent jurisprudence regarding gender equality and proselytism.  
 
5. National Authorities are Better-Placed   
 
The ECtHR has accepted under Article 9 and Article 2 Protocol 1, that the State 
authorities are better-placed to make decisions in the context of planning 
permission; 150  social policy, 151  financial policy; 152  education; 153  hospitals; 154 
prisons;155 policing156 and identity checks.157 The ECtHR has accepted that many of 
these restrictions on individual religious freedom pursue the grounds of ‘public 
safety’, ‘the protection of health and morals’ or ‘the protection of the rights and 
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freedoms of others’.158  Significant overlap can be observed between this justification 
for the award of the MoA and reconciling ‘a clash of rights’, as the State is often 
perceived by the ECtHR to be better-placed to reconcile any clash. The award of the 
MoA on the basis that the national authorities are better-placed results in a lack of 
scrutiny of the necessity of restrictions except where the State has a positive 
obligation to guarantee this right.  
In Chaplin, concerning the failure of a hospital to accommodate the wearing 
of crucifix by a nurse, the ECtHR held, ‘[t]he hospital managers were better placed to 
make decisions about clinical safety than a court’.159 While deference to hospital 
authorities appears to be appropriate, the MoA meant that the ECtHR did not consider 
the necessity of the restriction and, specifically, whether ‘less restrictive means’ were 
available to the hospital that would have satisfied the aim of the restriction whilst 
upholding the right of the applicant. As the issue arose as a result of a change in the 
design of the nurses’ uniform,160 the provision of an alternative uniform does not 
seem to be unduly burdensome and may have allowed Chaplin to continue to wear the 
crucifix. Although this solution may not be practical it does highlight why some 
oversight of the necessity of the interference with religious freedom by the ECtHR is 
desirable. 
 The wide deference to States on the basis of expertise also inhibits the 
identification of whether the interference with Article 9 ECHR is discriminatory. In 
Johannische Kirche, on the basis of the State’s wide MoA in planning matters, 161 the 
ECtHR did not consider in whether the denial of planning permission for a place of 
                                                
158 It is worth noting that in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the ECtHR simply accepted 
that failure to provide tax exemptions to the religious community was ‘in the public interest’, without 
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worship was discriminatory.162 In SAS¸ the ECtHR deferred to the State on the basis 
of the democratic decision-making process, despite acknowledging that 
‘Islamophobic remarks marked the debate which preceded the adoption of the 
Law’.163  The MoA permitted on the basis of democracy combined with the alleged 
‘lack of concrete consensus’ resulted in an almost complete lack of scrutiny of the 
necessity of the ‘burqa ban’. Yet, the Islamophobic nature of the debate highlighted 
the very deficiencies inherent in democratic decision-making that the Convention and 
ECtHR is supposed to guard against. The MoA has the potential to allow States an 
unchecked discretion to restrict religious freedom in cases concerning politically 
sensitive issues, without oversight of the motivations underpinning these limitations.  
 The ECtHR has, nonetheless, adopted a narrower MoA in Article 9 ECHR 
cases if the State has failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the rights 
contained in the Convention.164 Thus, although in Karaahmed the ECtHR accepted 
that the State had a wide MoA in relation to ‘operational matters’ pertaining to 
policing, the failure of the police to prevent demonstrators from interfering with 
religious worship meant than the State had not struck an appropriate balance between 
the rights of protesters and Article 9 ECHR.165 Similarly, the State has a positive 
obligation to ensure that prisoners are able to observe religious requirements whilst 
incarcerated. In this respect the ECtHR has examined whether the prison authorities 
have struck a fair balance between the religious freedom of the applicant and other 
competing interests, including the rights of other prisoners. 166  Thus, despite 
recognizing the MoA left to the prison authorities in these cases, the existence of a 
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positive obligation seems to result in the ECtHR exercising a higher level of scrutiny 
of the necessity of the interference with the applicant’s rights.  
 The ECtHR has permitted States a wide MoA in cases where the authorities 
are deemed to be better-placed to determine the appropriate course of action. The 
MoA in this respect is directly linked to democratic legitimacy and the perceived 
expertise of national authorities. However, the lack of scrutiny of the justifications for 
the interference with Article 9 ECHR by the ECtHR, means that it is not able to 
identify whether ‘less restrictive means’ were available or if ‘hostile-external 
preferences’167  were at play. As warned by Benvenisti, in these cases, the MoA 
‘reverts difficult policy questions back to national institutions, in complete disregard 




While the award of the MoA to States by the ECtHR in cases concerning freedom of 
religion or belief is not inherently problematic, in practice, it gives significant cause 
for concern. Deference to States in cases disclosing a clash of rights or where the 
national authorities are better-placed to make a decision appears to be justifiable. In 
contrast, in cases concerning an alleged lack of consensus, the basis of deference is 
often inappropriate or applied inconsistently, which in turn, undermines a good faith 
interpretation of the right and legal certainty. Once granted, the MoA appears to either 
be superfluous or go hand in hand with an almost complete lack of scrutiny of the 
State’s position. This lack of scrutiny is particularly problematic when the ECtHR 
allows States to determine both the scope of grounds of limitation and the appropriate 
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course of action. Rather than affording priority to the right to manifest religion, the 
ECtHR has, through the MoA, uncritically prioritized the State’s justification for 
limiting this right.  
The approach of the ECtHR has also led to apparent inconsistencies within its 
jurisprudence. While this can be rationalized in relation to the differential treatment of 
secular traditions as compared to Christian and Islamic traditions, it is not as easy to 
explain in cases concerning proselytism and gender equality. These inconsistencies 
are particularly problematic from the perspective of the rule of law and legal 
certainty. Further, it must be noted that these discrepancies primarily result in a 
reading down of the rights of those adhering to minority faiths and, worryingly, do 
not probe for discriminatory motives. As a result, the breadth of the MoA in the 
majority of cases concerning religious freedom is incompatible with the role of the 
ECtHR as ‘the conscience of Europe’.169 
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